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Louis Loss, associate general counsel of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, has written a formidable book. It is a comprehensive study
of the administration of two statutes, the Securities Act of 19331 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 But it is much more than that. In
its sweep is not only an organized legal analysis of the regulation of
securities, securities markets, and securities dealings and, to a great extent, of the securities business itself, but also a treatise "of administrative
law in action in one important field." Felicitously combining exhaustive
research with ad hoc administrative dissection, logic, tempered by agency
experience, with a not unnatural SEC bias, historical perspective with
the urge of recency, the book is encyclopedic in scope and analytical in
method. Mr. Loss has made a significant contribution to this "large acre"
of the law.
There is a certain nostalgia in the book, a remembrance. of things
only recently past. Whatever else it meant, to the lawyer, the New
Deal was a renaissance. New laws, new legal concepts, new juridical
approaches burgeoned. The law review editors, armed with their latest
reversal of the United States Supreme Court, went to Washington to
battle for the right, the truth, and the very uncommon man who had survived a world war and an economic debacle. A focal destination was the
Securities and Exchange Commission.3
While Mr. Loss does not reach the organization.of the Commission
as such until the last chapter, one aspect of the book is a not completely
uncritical survey of the agency, often called "an outstanding example of
the independent commission at its best." 4 This constitutes a laboratory
approach to administrative law. Its deficiency in this field is that it does
not encompass either intensively or extensively the work of the Commission; and this, in turn, is due to Mr. Loss' limitation of his subject. In
at least one-half of its life by far the most engrossing work of the SEC
1. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended 48 Stat. 905 (1934), 49 Stat. 557 (1935), 54
Stat. 857 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §77 et seq.
2. 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 49 Stat. 1375 (1936), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938),
58 Stat. 117 (1944), 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq.
3. The administration of the Securities Act of 1933 was vested in the Federal
Trade Commission; and it was only in the accompanying statute, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that the administration was set up in this independent agency.
4. Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions Prepared for the Commission
on Organization of the Executive Brawh of the Government 144 (1949). This accolade of a committee of the so-called Hoover Commission did not, to be sure, still
criticisms of specific actions of the agency (e.g., Id. at 148-9; Loss, SEcuRms
REGuLATioN 177, n.171). Mr. Loss' book appeared before the current Heller House
of Representatives Sub-Committee investigation got underway-the first full-scope
inquiry into the Commission's activities since its organzation some eighteen years
ago.
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has been in connection with the administration of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.5 While Mr. Loss purports to cover certain
aspects of this legislation, he does so only tangentially. There is no pretense of analyzing the cases arising under the Commission's paramount
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 11 of this statute and the allpervasive impact of that section on the regulation of securities of holding
7
companies and of their public utility subsidiaries.
If the book does not constitute a definitive study of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, it does more than trace the regulation of
securities by the Commission alone. After several chapters which traverse,
on the whole, well-traveled routes, passing English and American common law and statutory landmarks, Mr. Loss approaches the specific
impetus for federal legislation at the beginning of the Roosevelt administration. Of the many regulatory approaches available, the disclosure
5. 49 Stat. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79a. The other statutes which the Commission administers (in addition to the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange
Act) are the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa
et seq.; the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a
et seq.; the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b
et seq. The Commission also has "collaborative" functions under Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 54 Stat. 709 (1940), 60 Stat. 331 (1946), 11
U.S.C. §501 et seq.
6. This is the famous "death sentence" and corporate simplification section. It
is the corner-stone of the Act. If Mr. Loss were writing this book as of October,
1961, instead of October, 1951, then the casual treatment of the Public Utility Holding Company Act might not in and of itself vitiate the book as a study in administrative law so far as the then current existence of this particular administrative tribunal
would be concerned; for the Public Utility Holding Company Act, unlike the other
statutes which the Commission administers, is largely self-liquidating. (A history
and analysis of the administration of this most far-reaching, and, in its impact on
solvent companies, most radical, piece of legislation which any New Deal agency
was called upon to administer is still to be written. Perhaps the recently and tragically deceased Professor E. Merrick Dodd of Harvard would have been in a position
to supply this need. See, e.g., 56 HARv. L. Rrv. 780 (1942) ; 57 HAv. L. REv. 295
(1944); 58 HARv. L. Rav. 604 (1945); 63 HAv. L. REv. 298 (1949). A provocative article in this Review unsettled some of the hard crust of thinking in this new
field but stopped short where it might have gone forward. Blair-Smith and Helfenstein, A Death Sentence or aNew Lease on Life?: A Survey of Corporate Adjust
nents under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 94 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 148
(1946).
7. The peripheral treatment of the Commission's administration of the Public
Utility Holding Company de-emphasizes vital administrative problems arising throughout the proceedings, from the calling of hearings before examiners [see, e.g., current
federal-state controversy involving inter alia Sections 2(c), 11(b), 11(c), 11(d),
11(e), 12(d), 18(f) of the Act and innumerable rules thereunder as well as provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 60
Stat. 993 (1946), 61 Stat. 37 (1947), 61 Stat. 201 (1947), 62 Stat. 99 (1948), 5
U.S.C. § 1001, in such recent cases as Public Utility District Number One, etc. v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, No. 13243] 9th Cir., 1952 to judicial review of
the agency's actions [see, e.g., treatment of Section 11 reorganization plan review,
which is not adequate, despite citation (at p. 91, n. 147) of Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Central-Illinois Securities Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949); ef. Okin v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 145 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1944), remanded on other
grounds, 325 U.S. 840 (1945) ; Lownsbury v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
151 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. den. 326 U.S. 782; Blatchley v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 157 F.2d 898 (1st Cir. 1946) ; Goldfine v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 157 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1946); Leventritt v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 178 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Gilbert v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 146 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1944)].
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philosophy prevailed.8 "Honest dealing in securities" was the President's
phrase and is, in short, the abbreviated interpretation of the goal of the
two statutes, which are primarily the subject of this book.
By and large the Securities Act is concerned with the initial distribution of securities to the public, through the mails or the channels of interstate commerce. Specific registration statement requirements are detailed. The statute provides for civil and criminal liabilities and also contains a far-reaching anti-fraud provision. The anti-fraud provision covers
securities and transactions which are otherwise exempted by the statute.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 supplements the Securities Act.
It is concerned mainly with post-distribution tradings. As Mr. Loss
states, the Act has three basic purposes: "to afford a measure of disclosure
to people who buy and sell securities; to regulate the securities markets;
and to control the amount of the nation's credit which goes into those
markets.'
Mr.-Loss-combines a functional approach with an analytical scrutiny
of the various sections of both acts, which at times approximates only the
C. C. H. or Prentice-Hall securities service but which at other times confa-ins-a -sweeping and penetrating insight lacking in any such surveys. At
this point it might be pertinent to observe that the text of this work, like
the Wigmore to which Circuit Judge Jerome N. Frank, one-time Chairman
of the Commission, somewhat hyperbolically compares it, is an uneven
Pallimallfrv of writing. It ranges, within the iron cast of a purportedly
definitive work, from the most prosaic itemization (which often appears
for its own sake and which sometimes looks like a concatenation of staff
memoranda) to a coruscatinLIv brilliant exegesis. Its very weight reduces to a minimum any leavening process in thinking or presentation, and
at times there is a slight confusion between the vroliferation of footnotes
and the citation of relevant authorities. 10 But these must be considered
as only slight denigrating fly specks on the general appreciation of the

work.
In a short review it would be impossible to do justice to the detailed
map, which Mr. Loss draws, with all the main arteries and byways (even
bypaths) of this lay of the legal land. Perhaps the most interesting of the
developments in his treatment is that of the special SEC fraud theories
applicable mainly, although not exclusively, to corporate insiders. It is
an evolving concept which is becoming increasingly known but which at
8. See SEN. REP. No. 47, at 6-7, H.R. REP. No. 85, at 1-2, 73rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1933), incorporating message of the President. Unlike the Securities Act
and the Securities Exchange Act, the Public Utility Holding Company Act, on the
other hand, is of an all-embracing regulatory type for an entire industry. To a lesser
extent, also, the Investment Company Act goes beyond the disclosure technique of
regulation.
9. P. 84.
10. In this respect the book must be contrasted with the much slimmer and less
ambitious volume Understanding the Securities Act an the S.E.C., by Edward T.
McCormick, published in 1948, when Mr. McCormick was an Assistant Director
of the Corporation Finance Division of the Commission. Mr. McCormick subsequently became a member of the Commission itself and is now head of the New York
Curb Exchange. Mr. McCormick is not an attorney.
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first may have seemed astonishing, if not shocking, to what Roscoe Pound
has called "the lawyer taught the tough law."
One set of circumstances is as follows: Mr. A begins buying some
stock of the B corporation. He becomes increasingly interested in such
corporation and negotiates with the controlling stockholders of the B corporation to purchase their securities. At the same time he asks various
brokers, requesting them not to reveal his name or his position or inevitable position in the new company and not disclosing his program with
respect to the company, if he has any, to purchase, on the over-the-counter
market, the securities of the B company at the best prices obtainable.'1
If in fact the change in control of the company affects the value of the
stock (and it would be the atypical case when it would not) and if in fact
A's silence is not vitiated by material facts known to the stockholders
selling their securities, then
a. may A be enjoined, upon the instance of the SEC, in a district
court, from continuing to purchase stock through the brokers and even be
compelled to rescind the purchases made? and
b. may an individual stockholder who has sold his stock, sue, on his
own behalf and also on behalf of stockholders similarly situated, for damages or rescission?
2
The answer in both instances is, yes.'
The statutory basis for recovery is the broadly-phrased Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.'3
Under this section the
11. These are substantially the facts in the case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cohen, Civ. No. 5461, E.D. Pa. December 11, 1945, Litigation Release
311. Like in a number of these cases, no opinion was entered. The papers are of
record and are available to attorneys. Mr. Loss' table of cases does not include the
Cohen case, cited a number of times (see, e.g. at p. 823, n. 51; p. 827, n. 61) or other
similar matters, available as tools for the practitioner (see, e.g., in the same district:
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Greenfield, Civ. No. 5361, E.D. Pa., April 2,
1946, Litigation Release 302, 333). An expansion of the table of cases should be
considered in any revision of the volume.
12. See Loss, SEcu~iuns REGULATION 823 ff. Of course, when an individual
security holder sues, specific damage must be demonstrated. Some of Mr. Loss'
paragraph headings and section markings will indicate the scope, the problems, and
the difficulties involved. Among these are: "who is an 'insider'?," "purchases by the
issuer itself," "insiders' sales," "transactions on an exchange," "what must be disclosed," "duty of purchaser and his broker to investigate," "non-limitation . . . to
the organized markets," etc.
13. This reads as follows:
"Sec.10. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange . . .
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
The present reviewer could not but believe that the usefulness of this large and
somewhat physically unwieldy tome would have been not inconsiderably enhanced
by the inclusion in their entirety (in one place) of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act, apposite portions of the other statutes administered by the SEC
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Commission entered its equally broad Rule X-10B-5.14
This rule effected an expansion of the common law fraud concepts
and closed a loop-hole in securities sale and purchase regulation that may
not have been covered by the otherwise comprehensive Securities Act.
But aside from the hoary constitutional-administrative law problem of
sufficiency of the standard in the congressional delegation of authority, 15
the problems and difficulties arising under the rule are considered with
circumspection (at times Mr. Loss does not appear to go as far as the
cases do) and sagacity. In his discussion Mr. Loss is aided by only one
specific SEC report, and that almost to the year after the promulgation of
the rule;' 8 but even in so short a time he has a plethora of judicial determinations or references, to consider, assay, distinguish, clarify, and fit into
the flow and flux of the evolving regulatory jurisprudence. In this task
Mr. Loss is at his best. 17 He is excellent also in giving direction to this
duty-expanding legal concept.' 8
and relevant examples of the rules and regulations of the Commission promulgated
under the 1933 and 1934 acts; Obviously a full detailing of the rules (and forms)
would not be feasible, but the fifty pages that the above would take would be well
worth the space. Without the section printed inrextenso, the Damocles sword of
Mr. Loss' statutory interpretation often swings dangerously only in thin air. In this
respect the commercial services are not so parsimonious. Mr. Loss, no master of
brachvlozv. could have condensed far more than the necessary pages to have included
tlie matters.
14. Rule X-10B-5 reads as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
15. Cf. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1934).
16. Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 SEC 373 (1943). The report on the investigation was filed on May 20, 1943; Rule X-10B-5 became effective May 21, 1943
(Ex. Act Release No. 3230). An interesting account of this matter was included in
an address of the late Edward H. Cashion, counsel to the Corporation Finance Division of the Commission, who helped nudge the law in cases arising under the rule,
before the National Agsociation of State Securities Commissioners at St. Louis, on
December 13, 1944. See 1 P.H. Securities Regulation Par. 11,230.2. While the
La Frawe case is the only formal report of the Commission, the SEC has had occasion to consider the applicability of Rule X-10B-5 in a number of broker-dealer
revocation cases. These are set forth in a number of places in the book under discussion (pp. 839 ff.).
17. This reviewer's only negative reaction was to the perhaps necessary dichotomy
in the substantive treatment of the "fraud" concepts under Rule X-10B-5-if-823844) and the allegedly procedural problems (beginning at 1043).
Such questions
as the applicable statute of limitations present difficulties of presentation here as they
do in so many legal situations. The separation in the discussion gives rise to what
appears undue (albeit necessary) cross-referencing and restatement.
18. Most of the seminal cases under Rule X-10B-5 have arisen in the Third Circuit. E.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (on
motion to dismiss complaint), 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (on the merits), 83
F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (on requests for additional findings); see excerpt in
Loss, SEcuRTrEs REGULATIONS 1047-49; also 46 MIcH. L. REv. 680 (1948) ; Fry v.
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The entire volume is invaluable as an expression of 20th century law
in action. As such it must become part of the equipment of any wellrounded practitioner in this field, each of whom will thus become his own
critic suggesting rearrangements, more logical expression, correction of
the very few typographical inaccuracies, but not being able to add much to
the basic and well-thought-out dismuisition. New challenges should be
met by the promised pocket supplements.
In addition, the book may be of assistance to the ever increasingly
prolific fraternity of brokers, dealers, underwriters, investment advisers,
and investors-at least, those with the mental acuity and desire to serve
themselves, their clients and customers best in this regulated world. Occasionally lurid journalism to the contrary notwithstanding, the legal and
administrative climate of our times is far different from that of the world
the nineteenth century robber barons inhabited.
Then, too, Mr. Loss' book can supplement non-Langdellian courses
in the post World War II law school. The book is in fact being used at
least as an adjunct to the regular casebooks at Yale, where Mr. Loss was
a lecturer, and at Harvard, where he will be.19 As such a text, the book
has much to commend. To this end, it may be supposed Mr. Loss included excerpts from some ten decisions. On the whole, one may caxi
at this miniscule effort, both with respect to the specific inclusions as well
as to missing favorites. Frequently, too, the lengthy quotations, which in
any event cannot substitute for recourse to the reports, constitute an
trusion into the text of the book. 20 The happy welding of "raw materials"
with refined comment has not been effected. Nonetheless, the volume,
allusive and theoretical, as well as specific and practical, should serve as
a happy guide for the law professor exploring this no longer terraincognita
with applying students.
In spite of an embroidery of sometimes factitious literary allusions
and an assumed verbal sprightliness (and due often to it), Mr. Loss'
heavy book is not always a work of art. Perhaps it was not intended to be.
It is definitely, however, a substantial volume of thorough legal scholarship,
clear and incisive thinking, and shared experience.
Morris L. Forert
Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F.
Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947) (on motion for summary judgment), 99 F. Supp. 808
(D. Del. 1951) and 100 F. Supp. 461 (on the merits) ; Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft
Corporation, 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948) ; Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co.,
174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949); see also 44 IL. L. REv. 841 (1950); Robinson v.
Difford, 92 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1950); see also 64 -ARv. L. REv. 1018 (1951).
Then, too, see cases arising in the third circuit determined without opinion: at n.10,
spra. Also: McManus v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., Civ. No. 8015, E.D. Pa.,
July 30, 1948. As Mr. Loss points out (at 838, n.92), an excellent discussion of the
rule is contained in a comment in 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950).
19. The Harvard Law School Record 1 (February 21, 1952).
20. Compare comment on omission of text of statutes at note 12, smcpra.
t Member of the Philadelphia bar.

